government officials had reason to be deeply suspicious of Israeli intentions: Israel had secretly bought some 80-100 tons of “yellow cake” from Argentina it had secretly contracted with a French aviation company for development and production of a two-stage nuclear capable short-range ballistic missile Prime Minister Eshkol opposed assurance to UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser about the results of the Dimona inspections, that the U.S. inspection at Dimona on January 30, 1965, fail to uncover any “weapons-related activities” at the site, but in fact it revealed that the new Israeli nuclear complex was in a state of organizational confusion, even disarray, while senior staff morale was low. officials were uncertain, indeed puzzled, about the state and future direction of the Israeli nuclear complex at Dimona.

In contrast to Kissinger’s near certainty, other declassified documents published today reveal that by early 1965 most senior U.S. embassy officials on the talks, noting that Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres was “the strongest champion of nuclear weapons development as an absolute deterrent.” On Israel’s nuclear ambitions, according to the report, published today for the first time by the National Security Archive, Kissinger made the telling point that “he had a strong belief that Israel is already embarked on a nuclear program.” In January 1965, Harvard professor Henry Kissinger visited Israel where he met top government officials and nuclear scientists. Eshkol strongly objected because he wanted to keep Nasser guessing, but Johnson believed that assurances were necessary to keep the peace. One section of the posting covers the Johnson administration’s efforts to convince Eshkol to let Washington assure Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the results of the inspections: that Dimona was a peaceful project. Today’s publication, edited by Avner Cohen and Willam Burr, the latest by the Nuclear Vault project focusing on Israel’s nuclear program, consists of 32 documents about the Dimona inspections. inspectors uncovered no evidence of weapons work in 19 but believed that future regular inspections were essential. Kennedy, insisted on inspections of the Dimona complex to verify Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s pledge that Dimona was for peaceful purposes only. With rare exceptions, such as the astute Embassy Tel Aviv science attaché, Robert Webber, officials in the Lyndon Johnson administration believed incorrectly that the Israelis did not have plans underway to produce plutonium for weapons. Kissinger added that Israeli scientists were “very certain that such weapons were necessary and that they knew how to make them.” diplomats at the Embassy in Tel Aviv of his near certainty that Israel had begun a nuclear weapons project, according to a record of the meeting, which has recently been declassified and is published here for the first time by the National Security Archive. Washington D.C., Novem- After Harvard professor Henry Kissinger met with top Israeli officials in January 1965, he told U.S. FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports.

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